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Case No. 20040421-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions entered upon a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West 2004), and one count of unlawful 
possession or use of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West 2004), in the Seventh Judicial District, Iron County, the 
Honorable J. Bryce K. Bryner, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
discovered during a warrantless search, where the officers reasonably believed that trailer 
occupants were smoking marijuana and, by smoking it, were destroying evidence of a 
crime? 
This court reviews "[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence . . . under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. 
Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, % 7, 65 P.3d 314. 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is relevant to this appeal: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of unlawful possession or 
use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (methamphetamine); one count of unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) 
(marijuana); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; and one count of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(b)(iv). The 
information charged possession of the drugs and paraphernalia within 1000 feet of an 
elementary school, park, church, shopping mall, or parking lot. Rl-2. 
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On November 13, 2003, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found as a 
result of a search. R8-10. The trial court held a suppression hearing on December 12, 
2004. SeeR34. On May 3, 2004, the trial court denied the motion. R34-36. 
On May 17, 2004, the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea to possession of 
a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance, 
a class B misdemeanor. R41-48. As part of the plea, defendant reserved the right to 
appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. R45. Defendant also waived 
time for sentencing, and the trial court pronounced sentence. See Minute entry, sentence, 
judgment, commitment (not paginated).1 
On May 18, 2004, defendant filed her notice of appeal. R49. 
On May 25, 2004, the trial court entered its judgment, sentencing defendant to a 
one-to-fifteen-year prison term on the second degree felony and a six-month jail term on 
the class B misdemeanor, to run concurrently. R55-56. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The offense 
The charged offenses occurred on April 22, 2003. R42. Defendant admitted in 
her plea statement that she intentionally possessed methamphetamine and marijuana 
within 1000 feet of an elementary school, park, church, shopping mall, or parking lot. 
R42. 
1
 The minute entries in this case are not paginated and are not filed with the other 
portions of the record. They are filed under the docket on the inside front cover of the 
pleadings volume. 
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Proceedings on the motion to suppress 
Testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. On April 12, 2003, Eddie 
Horvath met with Price City police officer, William Barnes, at Eddie's store. R60:14. 
Eddie told him that Lance Horvath, Eddie's brother, was living in a camp trailer on his 
mother's property, that Lance appeared to be using drugs, and that Eddie and his mother 
were concerned that Lance might "get[] busted on their property" and that the police or 
courts might "seize their property." R60:15. Eddie also told Officer Barnes that Lance 
"had made threats, ah, towards the police," that "he had guns and would not hesitate to 
use them against police," and that he "wouldn't be taken alive." R60:16. 
Ten days later, on April 22, 2004, Carbon County sheriffs officer Rick Anderson 
and Price City police officer Brandon Sicilia called Officer Barnes just after 4:00 pm. 
R60:17. The officers said that Eddie and his mother, Sue Horvath, had contacted them, 
"complain[ing] that there was drug activity going on at the camp trailer right then; that 
there were four people inside the camp trailer, ah, smokin' marijuana, ah, even as we 
spoke, although they said that Lance was specifically not there." Id. Eddie had again 
cautioned the officers about the guns inside the trailer. Id. 
The three officers met at the Horvath residence at about 4:41 p.m. R60:18. Eddie 
reported that he had gone to the trailer under the pretext of "either lookin' for Lance or 
gettin' somethin', to see what was goin' on, and . . . observed people smokin' dope in 
there." Id. Eddie and Mrs. Horvath again indicated that "there were people in the trailer 
that were doing drugs" and "said that they didn't want their property to be in jeopardy." 
R60:42. Mrs. Horvath showed the officers her title to the trailer. R60:47. She "said that 
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the trailer was hers and that she wanted [the officers] to go in and—get the people out." 
R60:43. Mrs. Horvath consented to a search of the property, including the trailer, and 
Eddie again reminded the officers of the guns and urged them to be careful. R60:19. 
Knowing they had consent, that Lance was not present, and that several "unknown 
people [were] in there in the very act of committing a crime, smokin' dope," the officers 
approached the trailer. Id. They too could smell the odor of marijuana coming from the 
trailer. R60:19. They understood that Lance lived in the trailer, but saw this as "an 
opportunity to hit this trailer without Lance there" to "use the weapons that [we]re there 
against [them]." R60:20. While they recognized that any of the people in the trailer 
"could grab the weapons," Lance was their greatest concern. Id. 
On the basis of the foregoing matters and believing that "time [wa]s an issue" 
because the occupants were "in the very process of smokin' up the evidence," officers 
determined to enter the trailer without securing a warrant. R60:20-21. Moreover, one 
officer testified that he was "under the impression that nobody ha[d] a standing to be in 
that trailer" and he preferred to conduct a warrantless search, where possible, because 
obtaining a warrant required "[a] lot of work." R60:19, 34-35. 
Upon entry, the officers found defendant, who had spent the night; a male, who 
was wanted on outstanding warrants; and Lance's daughter, who was living in the trailer 
with her father. R60:22-24. They found various items of contraband, two rifles, and a 
loaded handgun "protruding out of the cushions on one of the benches." R60:26. 
At the time of the search, the officers had some indication that Mrs. Horvath and 
Eddie were living in the house, that Mrs. Horvath "was not staying in the trailer," and 
5 
that "Lance was staying in the trailer." R60:47-48. Officer Barnes knew, in fact, that 
Lance had been staying in the trailer for at least ten days. R60:37. The officers did not 
know that Lance had lived in the trailer for about ten years or that he paid his mother 
$100 a month in rent. See R.35. They did not know whether Mrs. Horvath could enter 
and leave the trailer at will. R60:46. 
Argument and ruling on motion to suppress. Following the hearing, defendant 
and the State filed memoranda presenting their arguments. R12-23, 24-32. The State 
argued, among other things, that the search was reasonable because Mrs. Horvath gave 
consent to search and because exigent circumstances were present. R24-32. 
The trial court found that "Mrs. Horvath did not actually have 'common authority' over 
the trailer which would authorize her to consent to the search of the trailer." R35. The 
court found, however, "that the officers reasonably believed that she had 'common 
authority' over the premises when she showed them the title and told them that she 
wanted [the occupants] out." Id (emphasis in original). The court found that "the 
officers in good faith entered the trailer believing that they had legal consent to search." 
Id. The court therefore found that the search was reasonable and denied the motion to 
suppress without reaching the "exigent circumstances" issue. R36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found the warrantless search reasonable under the "apparent 
authority" doctrine, but did not reach the State's alternative basis, the existence of exigent 
circumstances. This Court can affirm on that alternative and sounder basis, which is 
apparent on the face of the undisputed facts presented at the hearing on the motion to 
6 
suppress. The police officers had eyewitness reports that the occupants of the trailer were 
smoking marijuana at the time they responded to the property owner's complaint. 
Moreover, the officers could themselves smell the odor of bumed marijuana leaking from 
the trailer before they entered it. Based on these facts, the officers reasonably believed 
not only that a crime was occurring, but that evidence of the crime, i.e., the marijuana, 
was being bumed and that it could be destroyed while they sought a warrant. The 
officers therefore reasonably believed that exigent circumstances existed to support a 
warrantless search. 
ARGUMENT 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED 
TO SUPPORT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly held that "the officers reasonably 
believed that [Mrs. Horvath] had 'common authority' over the premises" when she 
consented to their entry into the trailer. R35; see also Br. Appellant at 1-3. The State 
argued below that the search was justified on the basis of (1) the apparent authority of 
Mrs. Horvath to give consent, and (2) the presence of exigent circumstances to justify the 
search. See R24, 28-31. The trial court concluded that the officers had apparent 
authority and denied the motion to suppress on that basis. While the trial court did not 
address the State's exigent circumstances argument, the exigent circumstances doctrine 
presents the sounder ground for upholding the search, and this Court may affirm on that 
basis. 
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A. This Court may affirm on an alternative basis apparent on the record. 
"Tt is well settled that [a reviewing court] may affirm a judgment of a lower court 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.'" State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ^ 21 n.8, 51 P.3d 55 (affirming trial court's denial of motion 
to suppress on alternative basis) (quoting State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 31, 994 P.2d 
1243), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (UT 2002). 
"Normally, when factual issues are involved in deciding a motion to suppress, trial 
courts are required to make detailed findings sufficient to enable appellate courts to 
adequately review the trial court's decision." Id. However, where the facts relevant to 
the alternative basis "are not in dispute," this court "need not remand for entry of factual 
findings." Id. 
In this case, the trial court did not reach the issue of exigent circumstances. 
However, the facts relevant to exigent circumstances are not in dispute. The witnesses 
did not present contradictory testimony. This Court may therefore affirm on the basis of 
2
 At the motion hearing, the State called three officers to testify to the 
circumstances of the search and to the evidence obtained. R60:12, 41, 49. Defense 
witnesses, all defendants in cases resulting from the search, testified to facts relative to 
their standing to contest the search and to possession and control of the trailer. R60:52, 
58, 69. The witnesses did not controvert one another, and the facts relevant to the 
challenged search are not in dispute. 
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facts "apparent on the face of the record" without remanding to the trial court for 
findings.3 
B. Probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches. See 
U.S. CONST amend. IV. "Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable." 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, "has 
recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule." Id. One of the exceptions is 
"exigent circumstances" or "a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law 
enforcement need." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001). Where officers have 
probable cause to believe that a home contains evidence of a crime and where they have 
good reason to fear that the evidence would be destroyed before they could return with a 
warrant, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry. See id.; see also State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at [^ 21 (holding that entry into a home was lawful where it 
was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances); State v. Callahan, 2004 UT 
App 164, Tf 6 (holding that "warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other 
private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances and probable 
cause") (citing State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13-14 (Utah App. 1993)). 
3
 State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159, holds that "an alternative ground 
for affirmance, raised for the first time on appeal," must "be apparent on the record" and 
"sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court." See id. at ^ [9 , 11 (emphasis 
added). Here, however, the State does not raise the alternative ground for the first time 
on appeal. Moreover, a conclusion that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
search is not inconsistent with the factual findings of the trial court. 
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1. The officers had probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being 
committed and that the trailer home contained evidence of the crime. 
Probable cause exists where the facts establish "a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983); see also Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at ^ 21 (stating that probable cause 
exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 
1986)) (in turn quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). Citizen 
reports of facts and circumstances are presumptively reliable. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. at 233-34. An informant's statement that he observed events first-hand is entitled to 
special consideration. See id. at 234. 
Here, probable cause is apparent on the face of the record. On the day of the 
search, Eddie Horvath, who had previously alerted police to apparent drug use in the 
trailer, called officers to indicate that several people were at that very moment inside the 
trailer smoking marijuana. R60:15, 17. When the officers arrived on the scene, Eddie 
and Mrs. Horvath reported "that there were people in the trailer that were doing drugs." 
R60:42. Eddie, in fact, had gone to the trailer and had "observed people smoking dope in 
there." R.60:18. As they approached the trailer, but before entering, the officers could 
also smell the odor of marijuana coming from the trailer. R60:19. 
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Thus, the officers had personal knowledge that marijuana was present in the 
trailer. Moreover, they had a complaint from a citizen who had seen individuals smoking 
marijuana and who reported that the smoking was occurring as the complaint was being 
made. These were "facts and circumstances within [the officers9] knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information" that sufficed "to warrant a [person] 
of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense ha[d] been or [was] being committed." 
See Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at *f 21 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, 
probable cause existed to justify the search. 
2. Exigent circumstances existed to justify the search of the trailer. 
Exigent circumstances "involve[] a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent 
law enforcement need." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331. They are present where 
"the exigencies of the situation make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 
(1948). 
Exigent circumstances are those "that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, or some other consequence improperly frustrating 
legitimate law enforcement efforts." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (internal quotation 
omitted). "The existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief 
of the police officer." Id 
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Exigent circumstances exist where officers smell marijuana burning. "The odor 
of burned marijuana provides a rational inference that marijuana is likely in the process 
of still being burned." State v. Decker, 580 P.2d 333, 336 (Ariz*1978) (en banc); see also 
State v. Kosman, 892 P.2d 207, 211 (Ariz;App. 1995) (same). The smell indicates that 
"the contraband [is] being destroyed" and that "[t]he delay necessary to obtain a warrant 
could mean that the marijuana would have been completely destroyed." Decker, 580 
P.2d at 336; see also Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) 
(concluding that "the distinct odor of burning marijuana . . . indicated that evidence of a 
crime, that is, possession of marijuana, was in the process of being burned and thereby 
destroyed," that "there was a very real and substantial likelihood that contraband would 
continue to be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained to search the motel room" 
and that exigent circumstances therefore existed to justify warrantless search), cert 
denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000); State v. Hess, 680 N.W.2d 314, 325 (S.D. 2004) (holding 
that consumption of methamphetamine presented exigent circumstances because the 
evidence was being destroyed and citing cases holding that "the smell of burning 
marijuana is itself proof that evidence of criminal conduct is being destroyed" and 
The mere presence of marijuana does not constitute exigent circumstances. Even 
where officers can smell marijuana leaves or detect the odor of stale marijuana smoke, 
they may have probable cause, but not exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless 
search because the smell of marijuana leaves or stale marijuana smoke, alone, does not 
suggest that marijuana is being smoked and is therefore in the process of destruction. See 
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah App. 1994), rev 'd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 
354 (Utah 1996). The smell of burning marijuana, however, indicates on-going 
destruction of evidence. 
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"detection of that smell establishes exigent circumstances"). But cf. Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding, in the context of a search incident to arrest, that 
smell of burning opium alone cannot create probable cause to effect an arrest where 
identity of user is not known).5 
Here, the officers reasonably believed that marijuana was being burned and that 
evidence was being destroyed. Prior to entry into the trailer, officers personally observed 
5
 Some courts have held "that the smell of burning marijuana does not evince a 
sufficiently grave offense to justify entering a residence without a warrant. These courts 
rely on the distinction between minor and serious offenses made by the United States 
Supreme Court in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 . . . (1984)." See Hess, 680 N.W.2d 
at 325 & n.27 (citing cases). Welsh involved the warrantless entry of a home to prevent 
the loss of evidence (dissipation of alcohol) following what appeared to be a noncriminal 
traffic offense for which no imprisonment was possible. See 466 U.S. at 753-54. 
Under Utah law, however, marijuana possession is a criminal offense and the 
offender is subject to imprisonment. Possession of marijuana can be a second-degree 
felony enhanceable to a first degree felony if committed within 1000 feet of an 
elementary school, park, church, shopping mall, or parking lot or if the offender has a 
prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) & (4). Second degree felonies are punishable by prison terms of one to fifteen years, 
and first degree felonies, by prison terms of five years to life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203 (West 2004). While possession of marijuana may under other circumstances 
constitute a lesser felony or a class A misdemeanor, depending on the amount of 
marijuana involved, even class A misdemeanors are punishable by prison terms not to 
exceed a year. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(1) (West 2004). Thus, under Utah law, 
possession of marijuana, even a first offense involving a small amount, is treated 
significantly more seriously than the noncriminal, nonjailable first offense drunk driving 
violation in Welsh. 
Furthermore, police here did not know whether they were dealing with first or 
repeat offenders or with small or large amounts of marijuana. Therefore, taking into 
consideration Utah's overall penalty structure for marijuana possession and the exigency 
presented here, the warrantless entry was necessary preserve evidence of a serious crime, 
and the Welsh rationale does not apply. 
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the "unmistakable" odor of "burnt marijuana" "leakin' out of the cracks of the trailer." 
R60:19. 
Moreover, they had citizen reports that the marijuana smoking was ongoing. On 
the day of the entry, Eddie Horvath called the police to "complain[] that there was drug 
activity going on at the camp trailer right then," that people were "smokin' marijuana . . . 
even as [they] spoke." R60:17. When the officers responded, Eddie and his mother 
again indicated that "there were people in the trailer that were doing drugs." R60:42. 
Eddie had gone out to the trailer and "personally observed people smokin' dope there." 
R60:18. Citizen reports are presumptively reliable. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 
233-34 (1983). An informant's statement that he observed events first-hand is entitled to 
special consideration. See id. at 234. 
In sum, based on the presumptively reliable information provided by Eddie and his 
mother, the officers believed "time [wa]s an issue" because the trailer occupants were "in 
the very process of smokin' up the evidence." R60:20-21. The officers therefore 
determined to enter the trailer without seeking a warrant. Id. On approach to the trailer, 
14 
the officers themselves could "smefl marijuana leakin' out of the cracks of the trailer."6 
R60:19. 
These facts supported a reasonable belief not only that marijuana was present, but 
that it was, at the time the officers entered, being smoked and destroyed. The officers 
therefore had a reasonable basis at the time of entry to conclude that exigent 
circumstances existed to support a warrantless search. 
Moreover, the exigencies in this case were also increased by the possibility that 
Lance would return while a warrant was being sought and that he would carry through on 
his prior threats to use his guns against police officers. See R60:16. The officers 
reasonably considered this matter in their assessment of the exigencies present in this 
case. See R60:20. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (holding that situations "that would cause 
a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to 
the officers or other persons" constitutes are exigent circumstances). 
6
 That the officers had already determined to enter the trailer when they smelled 
the odor of burnt marijuana leaking from it does not undermine the reasonableness of the 
search. The legality of a search or seizure is examined under a standard of objective 
reasonableness at the time the search occurs, without regard to the officers' subjective 
intent or when the subjective intent was formed. See Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at f 24 
(holding that exigent circumstances are those "that would cause a reasonable person" 
possessing the "facts known to officers at the time they acted" "to believe that entry . . . 
was necessary to prevent... the destruction of relevant evidence"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. The trial properly denied the motion 
to suppress because the officers reasonably believed that evidence was being destroyed. 
Respectfully submitted this M day of /\l#\/(/vW&/ , 2004. 
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